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Abstract: The present study joins the long-running debate about the semantic–
pragmatic distinction of the three domains of epistemic modality, evidentiality,
and factuality. In particular, this work aims at providing both a theoretical and
operational framework to investigate what type of speech act is at stake when a
speaker/writer alternatively decides to mark a proposition as an epistemic
modal, an evidential, or a factual construction. In fact, three basic types of
illocutionary force will be shown to determine the modal marking of a constative
speech act: evaluational (EvF(p)), presentative (PrF(p)), and assertive (AsF(p))
force. This classification is based on a set of tests that can effectively address
either grammaticalized constructions or pragmatic strategies, independent from
the specificity of the item under enquiry. This approach is first used to disen-
tangle the controversial meaning of MUST-type predicates and then further
theorized as a speech-act based framework of epistemic disambiguation.
Keywords: evidentiality, epistemic modality, factuality, illocutionary force,
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1 Introduction
This paper provides a theoretical discussion and an operational model offering
new tools to disentangle the three semantic–pragmatic domains of epistemic
modality, evidentiality, and factuality.
As a matter of fact, there is still lack of agreement concerning the semantic–
pragmatic boundaries that need to be drawn between some inferential functions
of evidentiality and the inferential/evaluational reasoning at the core of episte-
mic modality (e. g., Cornillie 2007 and Cornillie 2009; Mortelmans 2012; Nuyts
2001; Squartini 2008 and Squartini 2012). Similarly, not much has been achieved
in clarifying the relationship between evidentiality and factuality, as the two
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categories are often considered to be semantically equivalent or mutually
entailed (e. g., Willet 1988). This study aims to disentangle the three domains
of evidentiality, epistemic modality, and factuality by looking at the illocution-
ary force of an utterance when a specific construction or pragmatic strategy is at
stake. Compatibly with Reich’s (2011, 2012) redefinition of speech acts in terms of
overt influence attempts and overt co-act proposals (see Section 3), the present
paper provides a set of criteria that can be applied to both grammatical con-
structions and pragmatic strategies so as to define more clearly the boundaries
between the three aforementioned domains.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 serves as an introduction to the
recent literature focusing on the distinction between evidentiality, epistemic
modality, and factuality. Section 3 briefly outlines the theoretical framework
that will be used in the rest of this study. Section 4 shows some problematic
analyses and the lack of a generally applicable method of enquiry in the
literature about evidentiality and epistemic modality. To achieve this, the
whole section is focused on one of the most controversial constructions in the
literature, the so-called MUST-type predicates. What will emerge from this
analysis is a new model to disambiguate between the presentative, the evalua-
tional, and the assertive illocutionary force of a constative speech act. This
framework is further implemented in Section 5, where I address some potential
counterexamples to the theory and extend its applicability to both grammatica-
lized items and pragmatic strategies.
All the novel examples of this paper have been included in a questionnaire
given to 40 graduate native speakers of English and Italian, who were required
to judge whether the expressions proposed could be considered idiomatic/mean-
ingful or not (results are given as “Q_ (example number): x/40”).1 In order to
make sure that the respondents would be unaware of the subject matter of the
study, new variations of utterances with a similar context (e. g., apparently p
instead of must p) were given to a new group of students (again 40 graduate
native speakers of English or Italian).
The statistical significance of the results from the questionnaire is calculated
using the Fisher’s exact test (see Pedersen 1996). Additionally, as this work is
based on a set of illustrative examples from the most relevant literature on
evidentials and epistemic modals, the results from the questionnaire will be
further supported with corpus-based evidence from the BNC (British National
Corpus) and the itWaC (Italian Web as a corpus).
1 Q stands for “questionnaire.”
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2 Epistemic modality, evidentiality,
and factuality: Blurred lines
Epistemic modality, evidentiality, and factuality all have to do with the general
notion of modality. The latter is broadly intended as the speaker’s attitude
toward what he or she says or, in other words, as the relationship between the
speaker and his enunciation (Benveniste 1974 [1970]: 82).
More specifically, the state of affairs of a proposition is traditionally
addressed in dichotomist terms: p is either factual or modal(ized). While
modal expressions markedly problematize the intermediate space lying between
the positive and the negative pole, such as between do it and don’t do it, or it is
and it isn’t (e. g., Halliday and Matthiessen 2014: 176), factuality refers to the
state of affairs of a proposition posed as a fact, viz., something truly happening
in the real world. In the literature, the same concept is labeled in different ways:
notions such as realis (e. g., Mithun 1999; Palmer 2001); factuality, factivity,
reality, and actuality (e. g., Chung and Timberlake 1985; Kiparsky and Kiparsky
1971; Papafragou 2000; Squartini 2009 and Squartini 2012; Tantucci 2015a); and
validity (Dietrich 1992) all in a way or another refer to the same idea. Narrog
(2005, 2009, 2012) stresses the dichotomy between factuality and modality as he
defines the latter as the domain marking the nonfactuality or “undetermined-
factuality” of an event (Narrog 2005: 187). Beyond this primary distinction –
traditionally, albeit not universally endorsed (e. g., Squartini 2008 and Squartini
2012) – modal(ized) propositions are further divided into epistemic modals and
evidentials.
Namely, epistemic modality is defined as “the evaluation of the chances that
a certain hypothetical state of affairs under consideration (or some aspect of it)
will occur, is occurring or has occurred in a possible world” (Nuyts 2001: 21).
Conversely, evidentiality is alternatively said to refer to “the existence of a
source of evidence for some information” (Aikhenvald 2004: 1), the “encoding
of the speaker’s (type of) grounds for making a speech act” (Faller 2002: 2), or
the communication of a piece of “acquired knowledge” (Tantucci 2013: 214).
Evidentiality in English does not constitute a grammatical category and is
generally communicated through adverbials or discourse markers such as
apparently and allegedly (see Mushin 2001: 54; Narrog 2009: 10), predicates
conveying an evidential meaning such as it seems that, it appears that, and I
saw that, pragmatic strategies (see Aikhenvald 2004), or overtly expressed
contextual elements providing some type of information.
The growing interest in the concept of evidentiality in recent years has opened
new debates about the relationship between the two submodal domains of
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evidentiality and epistemic modality. Nonetheless, van der Auwera and Ammann
(2005: 307) lament that much of the controversies in the recent literature ended up
blurring the traditional borders of the two domains. Squartini (2012: 2116) notes
the attempts made “to pin down those epistemic functions in which epistemicity
and evidentiality overlap” (e. g., Palmer 2001), as new distinctions between evi-
dential functions (Kronning 2003; Pietrandrea 2005; Squartini 2009) and pure
epistemic modal constructions have been proposed.
After earlier pioneering studies focusing on grammaticalized evidential sys-
tems of the languages of North and South America, Tibetan, Japanese, languages
of the Balkan area, and Turkic and Iranian languages (e. g., Aikhenvald 2004;
Chafe and Nichols 1986; Johanson and Utas 2000; Willett 1988), a new interest
has been growing around evidential strategies and constructions in Romance and
Germanic languages (Diewald and Smirnova 2010; de Haan 1999 and de Haan
2001; Mortelmans 2000) with the common cause of disentangling epistemic modal
and evidential functions (e. g., Boye 2012; Cornillie 2007 and Cornillie 2009; Nuyts
2009 and Nuyts 2012; Plungian 2001; Sbisà 2014; Squartini 2008 and Squartini
2012). Nonetheless, despite most of the efforts made, the present literature is still
lacking an operational model that could equally address highly grammaticalized
constructions as well as pragmatic strategies aimed at conveying either an evi-
dential, an epistemic modal, or a factual meaning.
To achieve this, the present study will initially focus on what is probably the
most debated and controversial construction in the recent literature on evidenti-
ality and epistemic modality: the so-called MUST-type predicates (e. g., Cornillie
2009; Diewald 2000; Goossens 2001; de Haan 2001; Squartini 2008). The criteria
that I will adopt through the analysis of crosslinguistic data from the recent
literature will serve as the basis for a new taxonomy of constative speech acts,
viz., the ones traditionally intended to be “aimed at information transmission”
(Kissine 2013: 3), such as assertions, testimonies, conjectures, evaluations, and
so on. In this sense, it is important to note that in the specific literature of
evidentials and epistemic modals, not much attention has been paid to the
specific social action that is performed beyond a modalized proposition.2
The final aim of this study will be to ultimately distinguish between con-
stative speech acts carrying three basic types of illocutionary force (in the sense
of Searle 1969): evaluational (EvF(p)), presentative (PrF(p)) (this notion is first
proposed in Faller 2002), and assertive (AsF(p)).3 What will emerge from this
classification is a pragmatic account of what the SP/W (speaker/writer)
2 A notable exception is represented by the distinction between assertive and presentative
speech acts proposed by Faller (2002); see also Ifantidou (2001) and Sbisà (2014).
3 See Jary (2010) and Kissine (2013) for a detailed treatment of assertions.
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purposely decides to do when s/he marks a constative speech act in a particular
way rather than another. The methodology of this work will be then centered on
the relationship between the modal marking of a proposition and the social
action that the SP/W intends to perform.
3 Constative speech acts as overt influence
attempts
From a theoretical point of view, the present study is compatible with the view
of constative speech acts as overt influence attempts, or OIAs, proposed by
Reich (2011, 2012), according to which communicative acts are to be intended
“as proposals or requests for the addressee to carry out a cooperative response,”
with a special focus on “how the agency of addressees is implied by the
performance of many communicative acts” (Reich 2011: 1349)
While the traditional Austinian-Searlean model of communicative acts (see
Austin 1962; Searle 1969; Searle and Vanderveken 1985) assumes that commu-
nication is fundamentally aimed at sharing meanings, quite differently, the OIA
model is grounded in evolutionary theory, emphasizing the purpose of making
co-act proposals (CAPs) with the ultimate aim of exerting social influence. In this
respect, it is held that the Austinian-Searlean model “misses […] the way in
which a speaker […] uses an overtly intentional signal to solicit cooperation from
a hearer (addressee)” (Reich 2011: 1350).
Based on the redefinition of speech acts as OIAs, this study proposes a
taxonomy of constatives in which the illocutionary force of a statement corre-
sponds to SP/W’s attempt to perform three types of actions: presentation,
evaluation, and assertion. As will be discussed, the prototypical perlocutionary
effects (see Searle 1969) of a presentative speech act are obtained through
SP/W’s OIA of resulting reliable/trustworthy to AD/R’s (addressee/reader’s)
eyes.4 Conversely, evaluational speech acts are performed with the intention of
inducing AD/R to consider SP/W’s reasoning process about the truthfulness of p.
Finally, assertive speech acts are cooperatively aimed at establishing or main-
taining a proposition as a fact to be acknowledged by AD/R. That being said,
despite the OIA/CAP-oriented approach to speech events of this study, the three
4 Presentative type of co-act proposals are in fact ““on record” and targeted, addressees control
essential aspects of their behavioral response to them, and there are external mechanisms
(norms etc.) that frequently guarantee addressees who cooperate with signalers (or signalers
who offer help to addressees) a reward at a later point in time” (Reich 2011: 1356).
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notions of presentation, evaluation, and assertion will be still addressed with
the more familiar term of speech acts (instead of the novel label of CAP).
4 The MUST-type modal verbs
We can now start with a detailed analysis of MUST-type modal verbs and how
have they been approached in the recent literature. After pointing out some
problematic intuitions and possible contradictions among different treatments, I
will address the same phenomenon from a speech act–oriented perspective.
4.1 The Italian MUST-type dovere
Squartini (2008, 2012) opens an interesting discussion as to whether the source
of evidence for a modalized proposition is OTHER oriented rather than SELF
oriented – that is, internal or external source with respect to the speaker. He
further distinguishes between three types of evidential inference: circumstantial
inferences, generic inferences (based on general knowledge), and conjectures
(respectively given in examples (1)–(3) below).
According to Squartini, Italian dovere and French devoir intersect with only
two kinds of inferences: external evidence inferences and general knowledge
inferences. On the other hand, he claims that inferences of the conjectural type
are not allowed. For inferences of the latter type, the so-called conjectural future
needs to be used instead (see Squartini 2012: 2117 on the “claimed” evidential
meaning of conjectures):
(1) [Indicando un ragno.]
Attento, deve essere ancora vivo, perché ho visto che si muove.
[“Pointing to a spider.”]
“Be careful! It must still be alive, for I saw it moving.”
(2) [Suonano alla porta.]
Deve essere il postino.
[“The doorbell rings.”]
“It must be the postman.”
(3) [Suonano alla porta.]
Non aspettavo nessuno; *deve essere/sarà Gianni.
[“The doorbell rings.”]
“I was not expecting anybody.” * “It must/will be Gianni.”
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First of all, it needs to be observed that the examples above are construed
with the aim of being contextually based on (or rather “surrounded by”) some
evidence, viz, what Squartini defines as external evidence, general knowledge,
and conjectural evidence.5 In other words, the utterances in (1)–(3) imply evi-
dence precisely due to the physical and/or contextual information provided by
the author in each example. This would clearly not be a problem if such
preparatory conditions – that is, the necessary and sufficient conditions for
the successful performance of illocutionary acts (see Searle 1969) – would
specifically determine the usage of the “supposedly evidential” dovere at the
expenses of other nonevidential constructions or strategies. However, this does
not seem to be the case as all the constraints the we encounter with employment
of dovere are the same with either epistemic modal constructions such as
potrebbe “could/may/might” or the epistemic predicate (io) penso “I think”,
but also with modally unmarked factual assertions.
We can test this first with the epistemic modal predicate (io) penso “I think”:
(4) [Indicando un ragno.]
Attento, penso che sia ancora vivo, perché ho visto che si muove.
[“Pointing to a spider.”]
“Be careful! I think it’s still alive, for I saw it moving.”
(5) [Suonano alla porta.]
Penso che sia il postino.
[“The doorbell rings.”]
“I think that’s the postman.”
(6) [Suonano alla porta.]
Non aspettavo nessuno.??Penso che sia Gianni/sarà Gianni.
[“The doorbell rings.”]
“I was not expecting anybody.”?? “I think it is/will be Gianni.”
As can be noted, the same limitations encountered for dovere are found with
the employment of the epistemic modal predicate (io) penso “I think”. The latter
is commonly agreed to be a prototypical function of epistemic modality (e. g.,
5 In Squartini’s account, the latter may only be conveyed with the future as a marker of
inferences that are based solely on the SP/W’s own reasoning, thus excluding any form of
external evidence. As result, he maintains, “conjectures are necessarily more subjective and
therefore compatible with a reduction of the speaker’s commitment” (Squartini 2012: 2117).
Ultimately, the reason why dovere is not acceptable in (3) is claimed to be induced by the logical
and pragmatic expectation of the SP/W’s low commitment to the truthfulness of the proposition.
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Nuyts 2001; Tantucci 2015a; Traugott 1995), as it expresses the “evaluation of the
chances that a certain hypothetical state of affairs […] will occur, is occurring or
has occurred” (Nuyts 2001: 21). As a matter of fact, all information providing
evidence for the statements in (1)–(6) is either additionally given as contextual
elements (e. g., the doorbell rings) or as assertive clarifications of the SP/W,
precisely with the aim of giving substance to the utterance (e. g., for I saw it
moving). Such additional contextual elements crucially affect – to an equal
degree – the acceptability of both the employment of the MUST-type verb dovere
and to the one of (io) penso “I think”.
Most interestingly, even though in the case of (3), the use of dovere is more
problematic, the epistemic modal (io) penso “I think” in (6) shows the same
limitations. In fact, while Squartini correctly claims that in (3) the Italian con-
jectural future is more felicitous than dovere, the same applies to (io) penso
“I think” in (6) when replaced by the same construction.
To briefly summarize the main points raised so far, Squartini defines dovere
as an evidential construction that can express two forms of inference: external
and inference deriving from general knowledge.6 He argues this by showing the
compatibility of dovere in contexts where either external evidence or general
knowledge are expressed. On the other hand, he emphasizes, dovere is not
felicitous in contexts of speaker-oriented conjecture, in which the SP/W is
“solely responsible for the reasoning process” (Squartini 2008: 925).
What I show above is that such unequivocal “compatibility” with contexts
having to do with some external evidence or general knowledge is equally
matched by a prototypical epistemic modal construction such as (io) penso
“I think”. Additionally, it also needs to be considered that the different semantics
encoded by the future tense in (3) and (6) may regard a varying gradience of SP/
W’s commitment rather than the grammaticality of the proposition. In fact, while
the discussion from this section is purposely based on the “intuitive” criteria
originally provided in Squartini (2008), corpus evidence from the itWaC (Italian
Web as a Corpus; see Baroni et al. 2009) suggests that dovere and the conjectural
future are often interchangeable in contexts of external evidence.7 Crucially, the
present work aims at providing new operational tools to empirically address
semantic puzzles as such.
6 The latter is said to refer to Aikhenvald’s (2004) category of assumed evidentiality.
7 From two random samples of 100 occurrences of the epistemic usage of dovere (see Hoffmann
et al. 2008 on corpus sampling): Text 0067e0: Context [in the belly of the fish the heart of
another fish has been found] Questo pesce deve essere proprio uno spazzino “This fish must
really be a street cleaner.” The expression is also acceptable with the conjectural future: Questo
pesce sarà proprio uno spazzino.
188 V. Tantucci
Brought to you by | Lancaster University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/7/16 11:05 AM
4.1.1 Dovere versus potere
A similar case is constituted by the modal verb of epistemic possibility potere
“could/might/may” (encoded as potrebbe in the conditional mood). As shown
below, potrebbe implies evidentiality (i. e., inference from external evidence,
general knowledge) as much as dovere and (io) penso do in the same context:
(7) [Indicando un ragno.]
Attento, potrebbe essere ancora vivo, (perché) ho visto che si muove.
[“Pointing to a spider.”]
“Be careful! It may be still alive, for I saw it moving.”
(8) [Suonano alla porta.]
Potrebbe essere il postino.
[“The doorbell rings.”]
“It might be the postman.”
(9) [Suonano alla porta.]
Non aspettavo nessuno. Potrebbe essere Gianni/sarà Gianni.
[“The doorbell rings.”]
“I was not expecting anybody. It may be/will be Gianni.”
As can been observed, the epistemic modal potere “may/could” – which in
the literature is commonly assumed not to convey evidentiality – is acceptable
in all the contexts where dovere is expected to function as an evidential, as in
both (7) and (8) potrebbe implies evidence as much as must does in (5) and (6).8
Concerning the equal status of dovere and potere in the given contexts, we
should bear in mind that neither dovere nor potrebbe conveys factuality (see
Narrog 2005: 187 about the nonfactual status of modalized constructions), as both
(1) and (7) are easily defeasible by SP/W him/herself (Q_ (1a): 40/40; (7a): 40/40):9
(1) a. Attento, deve essere ancora vivo, anche se non ne sono sicuro.
“Be careful! It must still be alive, although I am not sure…”
8 In (9) the epistemic modal potere is acceptable as it expresses a comparatively lower
commitment to the evaluation, which can clearly map the meaning of a conjecture.
9 The string reads as follows: in the questionnaire Q_, 40 graduate native speakers out of 40
(40/40) judged the contextualized utterance in (1a) as a natural utterance in the sense of being
logical, easy to process, and noncontradictory; 40 graduate native speakers out of 40 (40/40)
judged the contextualized utterance in (7a) as a natural utterance in the sense of being logical,
easy to process, and noncontradictory.
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(7) a. Attento, potrebbe essere ancora vivo, anche se non ne sono sicuro.
“Be careful! It may/might/could still be alive, although I am not sure…”
On questionnaire Q_, 40 respondents answered a question preceded by a
statement giving basic contextual information about the utterance:
[The speaker points to a still spider on the ground]. S/he utters: (x). Does his/her speech
sound logical and easy to process to you? Answer “yes” or “no”.
As expected, 40 out of 40 respondents answered positively to both statements.
On the other hand, neither dovere nor potrebbe can be defeased if the SP/W’s
own evaluation is addressed instead (Q_ (1b): 1/40; (7b): 6/40):
(1) *b. Attento, deve essere ancora vivo, *anche se io non la penso così.
“Be careful! It must still be alive, although I don’t think so…”
(7) *b. Attento, potrebbe essere ancora vivo, *anche se io non la penso così.
“Be careful! It may/might/could still be alive, although I don’t think so…”
From above it emerges that both dovere and potere markedly express SP/W’s
evaluation (1b)–(7b) and do not mark p as factual ((1a) (*1b), p < 0.0001; (7a)
(*7b), p < 0.0001).10 Corpus evidence from the BNC confirms this fact: Within the
window −6 to −1, must occurs 471 times followed by though, although, however,
and nonetheless, but no cases are found in which SP/W subsequently questions
his/her own reasoning process. Crucially, if dovere were to be considered as an
evidential, it should then allow SP/W to carry information independently from
his/her own additional evaluations. However, as shown in (1b), the two are not
semantically/pragmatically detached from one another.
Conversely, things change with the employment of a prototypical evidential
construction such as parere “it seems”, conveying either reportivity or inferenti-
ality (see Ramat 1996: 293; Lazard 2000: 214; a similar test is provided in
Cornillie 2007 and Cornillie 2009: 52 about the Spanish parecér; Q_ (12): 39/40):
(10) Pare che sia ancora vivo, anche se io non la penso così.
“It seems that it is still alive, although I don’t think so …”
10 The mismatch between the positive answers in (1a) and (1b) is statistically significant,
p < 0.0001; the mismatch between the positive answers in (7a) and (7b) is statistically signifi-
cant, p < 0.0001.
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As can be noted, when the proposition is evidentially marked with parere, it
is then perfectly compatible with a separate evaluation made by SP/W. In fact,
the employment of parere in (10) changes the preparatory conditions of the
utterance, now significantly judged as acceptable by the respondents ((*1b)
(10), p < 0.0001; (*7b) (10), p < 0.0001). Namely, SP/W no more states that the
spider is alive as a result of an evaluation. Rather, the proposition in (10) is
posited as a piece of acquired knowledge, which can either correspond to
hearsay, or what “people” inferred or may infer from some evidence.
Different from dovere “must”, sembrare “seem” does not carry an
independent “evaluational force” (EvF(p)), which is inherent in any form of
(inter-)subjective evaluation: SP/W either evaluates p as an individual or takes
part in a “shared evaluation.” By contrast, parere simply encodes a piece of
information which is presented (PrF(p)) to AD/R, without any “evaluational”
involvement on behalf of SP/W (see Faller 2002 as she first elaborates the notion
of presentative speech acts). Simply put, I treat epistemic modality and eviden-
tiality as marked indicators of two different “social actions”: respectively eva-
luation vs. presentation (see Wilson 2011: 21–24 for an overview of procedural vs.
conceptual meaning). This claim is supported by the fact that out of two random
samples of 100 occurrences of the impersonal usage of pare che from the itWaC,
there are no cases where pare che p cannot be felicitously parsed with anche se
non la penso così “although I don’t think so”.11
4.1.2 Dovere vs factual assertions
Finally, the same contextual limitations encountered with dovere, (io) penso,
and potrebbe are also valid for modally unmarked factual assertions:
(11) [Indicando un ragno.]
Attento è ancora vivo, (perché) ho visto che si muove.
[“Pointing to a spider.”]
“Be careful! It’s alive, (for) I saw it moving.”
11 For example, 0000f5 Pare che cittadini polacchi siano coinvolti sempre più nel traffico di
amfetamine [anche se personalmente non penso che sia vero] “It seems that some Polish citizens
are increasingly involved in the traffic of amphetamines [although personally I don’t think this is
actually true].” On the other hand, the mere acquiring of this piece of information cannot be
questioned by SP/W him/herself: Pare che cittadini polacchi siano coinvolti sempre più nel traffico
di amfetamine [*anche se non ho saputo di ciò] “It seems that some Polish citizens are increasingly
involved in the traffic of amphetamines [*although I haven’t got to know about this].”
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(13) [Suonano alla porta.]
Non aspettavo nessuno.??E’ Gianni/sarà Gianni.
[“The doorbell rings.”]
“I was not expecting anybody.”??“It is/will be Gianni.”
From examples (11)–(13) we can note that even modally unmarked factual
assertions are equally acceptable in the overtly given contexts of (11) and (12), as
well as infelicitous in (13).
From the data discussed so far, the following conclusion can be drawn:
When external (circumstantial) evidence and/or general knowledge are contextually/
overtly given, whatever the modal marking of a statement among the ones considered
(viz., factual, epistemic modal, evidential), there are no semantic or grammatical con-
straints at stake: the proposition is always acceptable.
As a result, there seems to be no reason to consider dovere more evidential,
or rather, less epistemic modal than (io) penso “I think” or potrebbe “may/
might/could”.
4.2 MUST-type in English and the notion of evaluational
distancing
Similar to Squartini, Cornillie (2009: 50) comments on the inferential reading of
the English must and distinguishes between circumstantial, generic and con-
jectured inferences.
The one below is argued to be an example of circumstantial inference,
matching (1) proposed by Squartini:
(14) There is a wounded dog lying on the other side of the street. Itmust be in pain.
Cornillie observes that in (14) SP/W “believes that their own assessment of
the state of affairs, i. e. that a wounded dog lying on the street is in pain, is likely
to be true” (2009: 50). He further argues that both constructions of weak and
strong degree of certainty “do not differ from generic inferential readings”:
(15) There is a wounded dog lying on the other side of the street. It may be in pain.
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However, according to Cornillie, “it goes without saying that the evidential
dimension is more prominently present in epistemic must/moeten than in epis-
temic may/kunnen” (Cornillie 2009: 55), as the former is claimed to undergo a
diachronic shift from deontic modality to evidential modality. At this point, as
we did for the Italian examples given by Squartini, we may reverse Cornillie’s
observation by pointing out that there is also no empirical criterion to support
an evidential interpretation either for must or for may. In fact, even a factual
assertion is perfectly acceptable in the same context (Q_ (18): 40/40):
(16) There is a wounded dog lying on the other side of the street. It’s in pain.
As already discussed, when inferences from circumstantial evidence are
overtly/contextually expressed, a proposition implies evidentiality no matter
what the modal marking of the following statements (i. e., must, may or
unmarked factual assertions). That is, the implied evidential meaning in (14)–
(16) is precisely given by that contextual indication that There is a wounded dog
lying on the other side of the street. Due to this contextual information, any
subsequent comment made by SP/W will – in one way or another – logically
imply an inference drawn from some circumstantial evidence, and thus unmis-
takably fit into the category of circumstantial evidentiality.
On the other hand, it is possible to find operational criteria to show that
must in (14) carries an evaluational force (EvF(p)) rather than a presentative one
(PrF(p)). To do so, it is necessary to draw from Nuyts (2009), who – applying
Chafe’s (1994) claim of one idea per intonation unit – argues for the cognitive
implausibility of combining more than one modal qualification per clause. This
is easily assessed by separating SP/W’s evaluation, from the evidence s/he
provides (Q_ (17): 36/40; (18): 38/40):
(17) It seems that there is a wounded dog lying on the other side of the street.
Apparently it’s in pain, and I also think so.
(18) It seems that there is a wounded dog lying on the other side of the street.
Apparently it’s in pain, though I don’t think so.
As can be seen in (17) and (18), when the two speech acts (presentative and
evaluational) are expressed as a separate intonation units, the resulting evalua-
tion is idiomatic and easily processed.12
12 In fact, SP/W may either refer to some deceiving appearance of the dog’s state (i. e., it looks
like it’s in pain, but personally I don’t think so), to some reportative interpretation (i. e., SP/W
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I define this operation as evaluational distancing, namely:
the possibility on behalf of SP/W to make a subjective evaluation with regard to a piece of
information s/he provides.
This will turn out to be an effective criterion to judge whether SP/W is merely
“presenting” a piece of information to AD/R, or whether s/he rather takes part in
an evaluational process (which can be either subjective or jointly intersubjective).
As a result of this, a general dual axiom can be drawn about the intersection
between assertive/presentative force and assertive/negative polarity:
(19) a. EvF(p) + EvF(−p) ⊢ ⊥
b. PrF(p) + EvF(−p) ⊬ ⊥
The two formulas in (19) read as follows:
a. An evaluational speech act EvF(p) immediately followed by an evaluational
speech act EvF(−p) leads (⊢) to contradiction (⊥).
b. A presentative speech act PrF(p) immediately followed by an evaluational
speech act EvF(−p) does not lead (⊬) to contradiction (⊥).
In fact, when a presentative speech act is realized, a consequent negative
evaluation about the state of affairs of p is possible. On the other hand, an
evaluational speech act EvF(p) does not logically allow a consequent negative
evaluation of the state of affairs of p EvF(−p). Based on this, it is easily proved
that must shows a distinct tendency to carry evaluational force, not allowing a
subsequent negative evaluational distancing (Q_ (20): 2/40):13
(20) There is a wounded dog lying on the other side of the street. It must be in
pain, *though I don’t think so.
Given these points, a crucial question that seems to have been partly
neglected in the literature is how – rather than when – evidence can be referred
to in language. As pointed out by Plungian (2001: 254), “evidence is always
inherently present in epistemic meaning.” Similarly, Nuyts emphasizes that “in
principle, without any evidence one cannot evaluate the probability of the state
heard someone saying that the dog is in pain) or to some circumstantial evidence from which
the inference p may be drawn (i. e., SP/W refers to what might be inferred from noticing that
someone is hurriedly approaching the dog to check whether it is suffering).
13 It was markedly excluded from the questionnaire the possibility of an afterthought or a
second thought after the first evaluation: that is, it must be p … actually, no I don’t think so
anymore.
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of affairs: one can then only say that one does not know” (2001: 34). Indeed,
communication is not possible without some evidence either being overtly
expressed or covertly implied. However, this clearly cannot entail that every
utterance we pronounce is – in one way or another – an evidential construction.
Where do the boundaries need to be drawn then?
The only way out – I claim here and further maintain in the rest of this work –
is to look at the illocutionary force of a constative speech act: What are we doing
when we mark a statement in a way or another? Do our actions change?
As far as this discussion is showing, the main aim of this study is to demon-
strate that they do, and that the categories of evidentiality, epistemic modality and
factuality crucially intersect with the encoding of three different subtypes of
constative speech acts: presentative (see Faller 2002), evaluational and assertive.
4.3 MUST-type in German and Dutch
This subsection is centered on the claimed evidential status of MUST-type pre-
dicates in German and Dutch. The German müssen is discussed in Diewald (1999:
215 ff.) as a construction of probability, certainty and conviction. Salkie (2002) also
presents a contrastive (English–German) corpus-based account of the modals
must and should, arguing that English epistemic must cannot refer to future states
of affairs, whereas German epistemic müssen can (2002: 93). Quite differently, de
Haan (2001, 2009, 2010) stresses that the Dutchmoeten simply asserts that there is
(indirect) evidence for the statement made, without drawing any conclusions from
it. Conversely, he refers to the English nonroot must as merely “evaluative.” De
Haan’s position is explicitly questioned by Narrog (2010: 119), who reinforces the
idea of an evidential (inferential) interpretation of the English must. Similarly,
based on a self-compiled English–Dutch–German translation corpus of fictional
texts, Mortelmans (2012) proposes that must tends to be translated into by moeten
and/or müssen when referring “to the contextual presence of external evidence,
upon which the inference is based” (2012: 2157). With this she holds that the
Dutch and German cognates of must are evidentials of inference based either on
circumstantial or general knowledge (Mortelmans 2012: 2157):
(21) ENG “Somebody must have buried the body”, I said.
DUT “Iemand moet het lijk begraven hebben”, zei ik.
GER “Jemand muß die Leiche vergraben haben”, sagte ich.
Mortelmans argues that in (21) the SP/W makes a conclusion “upon finding
a body that clearly has been buried (it was found underneath a barbeque)”
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(2012: 2157). While this is undoubtedly true, however, despite the contextual
indications of some external evidence, neither moet or muß can be felicitously
detached from SP/W’s separate evaluation; that is, they do not allow an evalua-
tional distancing from the statement (EvF(p) + EvF(−p) ⊢ ⊥):
(21) ENG *a. “Somebody must have buried the body”, *though I don’t think
so. (Q_ (29a): 2/40)
DUT *a. Iemand moet het lijk begraven hebben, *maar ik denk niet dat
dat klopt.
GER *a. Jemand muß die Leiche vergraben haben, *obwohl ich nicht
glaube, dass.
On the other hand, some evaluational distancing is possible if the evidence
is simply provided (presented), without an epistemic modal (viz., evaluational)
involvement of SP/W (PrF(−p) + EvF(p) ⊬ ⊥):
(22) ENG b. Apparently, somebody have buried the body, though I don’t
think so. (Q_ (30b): 37/40)
DUT b. Schijnaar heeft iemand het lijkt begraven, maar ik denk niet dat
dat klopt.
GER b. Es scheint, jemand hat die Leiche vergraben. Aber ich glaube
nicht, dass das der Fall ist.
Finally, a most interesting case from Mortelmans’s corpus survey is the
following example: “In this particular passage, the speaker […] is being carried
away and confesses that he has murdered someone […]. On realizing what he has
been saying, [he] tries to correct himself and create the impression that his victim
did not die from the beating, but from a weak heart” (Mortelmans 2012: 2158):
(23) ENG And the long and the short of it is I loses my head which is a thing I
never ought to a done with the worry of them photos an all. And I hits
him. I hits him. Pause. He must have had a weak heart. (ORT, 125)
DUT enfin ik verlies m’n verstand, wa ’k normaal nie zou doen moest ik nie
met die foto’s in m’ne kop zitten. En ik sloeg ’m. Ik sloeg ’m. Hij moet
een zwak hart gehad hebben. (ORT, Manuscript)
GER Und um es kurz zu machen: ich verliere den Kopf, das hätte mir nicht
passieren dürfen, aus Angst vor den Fotos und alldem. Und ich schlage
zu. Schlage zu. Pause. Er muß ein schwaches Herz gehabt haben.
(ORT, manuscript)
The first point to be made is that, as expected, an evaluational distancing is
not possible in none of the three languages:
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(23) ENG *a. […] He must have had a weak heart, *but I don’t think so. (Q_
(31a): 2/40)
DUT *a. […] Hij moet een zwak hart gehad hebben, *maar ik denk niet
dat dat klopt.
GER *a. […] Er muß ein schwaches Herz gehabt haben, *obwohl ich nicht
glaube, dass das der Fall ist/war.
Most crucially, the evaluational force of must is confirmed contextually by
the OIA of SP/W in (23), the perlocutionary effects of which are the ones of
convincing/persuading AD/R that he is not the murderer. In a similar example
considered in Reich (2011), a shoplifter has just been stopped and handcuffed by
a police officer. At that point, the shoplifter tries to protest her innocence.
According to Reich, in so doing, not only does she “want the officer to acquire
a belief, she also wants to affect the course of the interaction and be released”
(2011: 1357). Similarly, by uttering He must have had a weak heart in (23), SP/W
is far from presenting to AD/R a piece of information s/he acquired from the
external world, or in other words, s/he is not merely informing AD/R of p.
Rather, s/he is engaging AD/R in a cooperative act of evaluation of the state
of affairs of p (as a CAP), with the aim of persuading AD/R that s/he is not guilty
(as its perlocutionary effects).
As we discussed in Section 2, the prototypical OIA of evidential construc-
tions or strategies is to act as a reliable individual who can be trusted in future
“overt cooperative attempts.” Conversely, the OIA of an epistemic modal state-
ment is to engage AD/R in the cooperative activity of evaluating the truthfulness
of p, as the usage of must in (23) so clearly exemplifies.
5 Toward a taxonomy of constatives: Pragmatic
distinctions
Based on the analysis in Section 4, this final section consolidates the present
model as it further distinguishes evaluations from evidential inference (Section
5.1), evaluations from concessives (Section 5.2), and evaluational distancing
from factual distancing (Section 5.3).
5.1 Evaluation versus evidential inference
As discussed in Lazard (1999, 2001; see also Mushin 2001; Tantucci 2013 and
Tantucci 2015c), indirect evidential constructions merging together reportative,
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inferential, and mirative14 meanings are felicitously paraphrased as apparently,
it seems, and as it appears. This type of evidential function is referred to in
different ways. It is defined as indirective (Johanson 2003) and nonconfirmative
(Aronson 1967; Friedman 2003). It is said to belong to the A2 subcategory – that
is, indirect knowledge corresponding to a separated marked function – in
Aikhenvald’s (2004) typological classification. Comparatively, in Lazard (1999,
2001), Guentchéva (1996), and Guentchéva and Londaburu (2007), the term
mediativity is adopted. Finally, in Tantucci (2013, 2015b) the pragmatic notion
of interpersonal evidentiality (IE) is used to address similar phenomena and
their grammaticalized equivalents in Mandarin and other Sinitic languages.
Those scholars who argue for an evidential reading of the so-called MUST-
type verbs more or less explicitly base their argumentation on either the repor-
tative or the inferential usages of the said verb type. In other words, as the
aforementioned grammaticalized evidential systems are said to convey either
evidential reportativity or inferentiality, a similar space on an ideal semantic
map (see Anderson 1986; van der Auwera and Plungian 1998; Plungian 2001)
has been argued to be occupied by the reportative, inferential, and conjectural
readings of MUST-type verbs.
While this may seem a fair reason to classify MUST-type verbs as proper
evidential constructions, there are two fundamental aspects of the latter which
have been partly neglected or not fully exploited:
a. subjective vs. intersubjective evaluation
b. illocutionary force
Similar to what Squartini points out about the mode of knowing, Nuyts
distinguishes between subjective and intersubjective qualification of a modal
evaluation (2012: 58):
A modal evaluation is subjective if it is presented as being strictly the assessor’s sole respon-
sibility. A modal evaluation is “intersubjective” if it is presented as being shared between the
assessor and a wider group of people, possibly (but not necessarily) including the hearer.
I propose that this definition should intersect with both points (a) and (b)
above. In fact, although evaluations may be subjective or intersubjective
(shared), nonetheless, to be considered as such, they always need to carry an
evaluational force, EvF(p). The evaluational force of an utterance is subjective
when SP/W alone evaluates the truthfulness of p. On the other hand, it is
intersubjective when SP/W joins a shared evaluation about the truthfulness of p.
14 Mirativity as a typological category encodes the speaker’s surprise or the unpreparedness of
their mind (e. g., DeLancey 1997 and DeLancey 2001).
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This entails that when a statement is marked (linguistically or multimodally)
as an evaluation, it prototypically maps the semantic structure of epistemic
modality, as the latter is well known to literally regard the “evaluation of the
probability of the state of affairs” (Nuyts 2001: 21). On the other hand, when SP/
W merely “presents” evaluations/inferences made by others to AD/R (e. g., it is
believed that p or people think that p), then SP/W is doing nothing but informing
AD/R of a piece of evidence. In this latter case, the prototypical characteristic of
the domain of evidentiality is constituted by the presentative force PrF(p) of an
utterance, viz, the mere speech act of informing AD/R of a piece of knowledge
that SP/W has markedly acquired somehow. As matter of fact, any function of
evidentiality – be it visual, auditory, based on hearsay, IE, inferential, and so
on – is inherently conductive to the realization of a presentative speech act and
is thus always open to the evaluational distancing on behalf of SP/W.
This disambiguation can then be completely explicated by answering the
following question: Can evaluations contextually imply some external evidence?
They truly can, but only as a result of a conversational implicature, viz. not
independently carrying a presentative force. This is precisely the reason why
many scholars have been drawn to the idea that MUST-type predicates are to be
considered as evidential constructions.
Simply put, a piece of evidence can be either overtly communicated or
barely implied: While a presentative speech act is optimally relevant (see
Sperber and Wilson 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2012) if it communicates the
existence of a piece of acquired information/knowledge, quite differently, an
evaluational speech act finds its optimal relevance in the subjective or shared
evaluation of some state of affairs.15 Clearly, evaluations, to different degrees,
will always imply some evidence upon which the utterance is based, thus
functioning as “evidential triggers,” so to speak. However, the core meaning of
an evaluation is to engage AD/R in SP/W’s reasoning process, not the one of
providing information.
Consider the famous example given by Slobin and Aksu about the gramma-
ticalized mediative marker -miʂ in Turkish (1982: 187):
15 Different from Reich, this study regards the presumption of optimal relevance (see Sperber
and Wilson 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2012) as a pragmatic mechanism that is precisely
motivated by OIAs. Namely, if SP/W wants to influence AD/R in thinking/acting in a coopera-
tive manner – this is the fundamental assumption of OIA’s theory – then SP/W will need to
posit p in a way that is both relevant/advantageous for his/her purpose and that is also
considered relevant/advantageous for the purposes of AD/R, so that AD/R will then have a
reason to act cooperatively (e. g., executing an order, believing a statement and so on). This
simply entails that, from a neo-Darwinian perspective, what is relevant can be fairly considered
equal to what is advantageous.
Toward a typology of constative speech acts 199
Brought to you by | Lancaster University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/7/16 11:05 AM
(24) Kemal gel-miʂ
Kemal come-IND
“Kemal came (as it appears)”
In (24) above, the inflectional marker -miʂ corresponds to a grammaticalized
evidential construction inherently carrying a presentative force. It may express
that SP/W was told about Kemal’s arrival, it may provide information as to what
people may infer or have inferred (due to some circumstantial evidence), or it may
even convey a mirative meaning by which SP/W is noting some unexpected
evidence occurring in front of his/her eyes. DeLancey (1997: 40) emphasizes
that “the […] paradoxical range of use of the Turkish form […] is […] a pattern
motivated by cross-linguistically relevant considerations.” According to Slobin
and Aksu, all the usages of -miʂ have a “common core of psychological distancing
from the event” (1982: 196). Lazard (1999: 95) also notes a distance established by
the SP/W from his/her own speech: “They are expressing them mediately, […]
placing themselves, so to speak, at a distance from what they are saying.”
What clearly emerges from the descriptions above is a speech act type where
SP/W merely “presents” some evidence for the benefit of AD/R, without an overt
epistemic involvement in his/her own statement. As a result, SP/W’s utterance is
accordingly open to further evaluations on his/her behalf (viz., evaluational
distancing), as s/he could then – and just then – comment on the evidence s/
he has just provided.
5.2 Evaluations versus concessives
We are now to briefly consider a potential counterexample to the distinction
between presentative and evaluational force. Let us start from the usage from
Section 4.3 of may and must provided by Cornillie (2009: 50):
(25) There is a wounded dog lying on the other side of the street. Itmust be in pain.
As statistically demonstrated previously, must does not allow an evalua-
tional distancing on behalf of SP/W:
(25) *a.There is a wounded dog lying on the other side of the street. It must be
in pain, *but I don’t think so.
However, with the employment of the weak-epistemic may, a subsequent
evaluational distancing is open to two different readings:
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(26) *a. There is a wounded dog lying on the other side of the street. It may be
in pain, *but I don’t think so.
b. There is a wounded dog lying on the other side of the street. It may be
in pain, but I don’t think so.
In which respect does (26a) differ from the stressed version of may in (26b)?
(26a) is an evaluational speech act: SP/W makes a subjective – or takes part in
an intersubjective – evaluation about some state of affairs. As a result of this, if
s/he negates p, s/he will then logically contradict him/herself. In this sense, may
is a marker of epistemic modality as much as must would be in the same context.
Quite differently, the stressed version of may in (26b) functions as the
protasis of a concessive construction: although p, on the contrary q. In this
case, may represents a semantic evolution from root-possibility and epistemicity
to concessivity, as suggested in Bybee et al. (1994). Squartini (2012) observes that
the protasis of a concessive construction provides some evidence/knowledge for
the benefit of AD/R, which SP/W may then comment in the apodosis. Based on
the present model, the protasis of a concessive is then inherently presentative,
while the apodosis is likely to be – though not necessarily – evaluational:
I am providing this piece of acquired knowledge, but I am subsequently expressing a
contrastive evaluation/information.
As first argued in Sweetser (1990: 69–73), once modal constructions are used as
concessive markers, they are “conversationally reinterpreted” as speech-act
modals, thus losing their original root and epistemic meanings. This point is
further supported by the claimed “polyphonic” dimension of concessivity, which
“more directly impinges on evidentiality rather than epistemicity” (Kronning
2003; Squartini 2012).
In Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson (2000: 382), interactional concessivity is
said to involve a dyadic structure in which participant B, acknowledging a
statement made by participant A, “reports” it. In this sense, with the concessive
use of may in (26b), SP/W does not make an evaluation, but rather intersubjec-
tively “presents” what (some) other(s) have inferred or may be expected to infer
from some external evidence. As a result, the presentative status of p in (26b)
will then allow a subsequent evaluational distancing (but I don’t think so).
Concerning this point, it needs to be stressed that may and similar markers
of epistemic possibility (e. g., could, might) are compatible with this highly
intersubjectified concessive employment (see Traugott and Dasher 2002: 115;
Narrog 2010: 31 and Narrog 2012: 36) where – I add – a semasiological shift
occurs from the encoding of an original evaluational force to a newly reanalyzed
presentative one.
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The process of intersubjectification of may is one important indicator of the
diachronic continuum from epistemic modality to evidentiality (e. g., Nuyts
2012), or, in other words, from constructions of evaluation to constructions of
presentation. This is precisely the reason why an operational model to disam-
biguate the illocutionary force conveyed through a modal construction at a
certain stage of semantic change is needed.
5.3 Presentative versus assertive force: Toward a taxonomy
of constatives
The last point to be made is that the notion of presentative force is “at issue”
even in constructions encoding visual evidence. In fact, in such cases, SP/W is
not making an evaluation about the truthfulness of p, but rather merely pre-
senting some sensory evidence for the benefit of AD/R. In other words, when we
report about what we saw, it is not really at issue what we think about it, but
rather the sensorial reliability of the piece of information we are providing.
To give an example, Korean firsthand evidentials are usually intended to
express some sort of psychological distance, elsewhere defined also in terms of
weakened reliability, lack of responsibility, or severance of consciousness (e. g.,
Im 1982; Kim 1981; Shin 1980). Chung (2010) notes that they encode “presenta-
tive speech acts” rather than “assertive”’ ones (see Faller 2002). In the former
case, SP/W merely presents or introduces a piece of information without a
personal commitment to the truth of his/her own evaluation; in the latter case,
the information is supported by SP/W’s personal commitment to the factuality of
p. Consider the pair of examples below (Chung 2010: 933):
(27) a. mary-ka phyenci-lul ssu-te-la.
Mary-NOM letter-ACC write-S.PAST-PRST
“I saw Mary was writing a/the letter.”
b. mary-ka phyenci-lul ssu-ko iss-ess-ta.
Mary-NOM letter-ACC write-CONJ be-PRF-DEC
“Mary was writing a/the letter.”
Although in the literature direct evidentials are traditionally equated with
factuality (see Willett 1988), Chung describes (27a) as a form of presentative
statement, whereby SP/W is neither making an evaluation nor assertively
expressing a factual proposition. Rather, s/he merely communicates what s/he
saw with his/her own eyes. Simply put, SP/W here serves as a channel through
which the proposition is obtained and delivered to the hearer: from what I saw,
p. Conversely, in (27b) SP/W makes an assertion – which pragmatically always
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carries assertive force (AstF(p)) – as s/he states a factual proposition without
problematizing p in terms of some source of information (what evidentials do) or
the evaluation of the state of affairs (this is the case of epistemic modals).
Crucially, illocutionary speech acts are ascriptive to a specific action as they
satisfy “a commitment as having resulted from the performance” (Croddy 2002:
1116). This brings us to the conclusive claim of this study, as we are finally able
to propose an onomasiological taxonomy of constative speech acts, based on
two forms of pragmatic ascription:
a. SP/W’s ascription to his/her own evaluation.
b. SP/W’s ascription to the factuality of his/her statement.
(a) has to do with the SP/W being more or less committed to his/her own
reasoning process, that is, the creative production of a judgment about some state
of affairs. On the other hand, (b) regards SP/W’s ascription to the state of affairs of
a situation independently from what his/her evaluation may be. The two in fact
do not need to coincide, in the sense that SP/W may communicate his/her own
evaluation without being certain that what s/he thinks is an undeniable fact. On
the other hand, in the second case s/he may posit a statement as a mere fact,
without the need to problematize the state of affairs of p.
While the former may be tested through the evaluational distancing from p
(but I don’t think so), in the second case, SP/W may or may not establish a
factual distancing from p (but I am not sure). As the former – we have seen –
constitutes a powerful criterion to distinguish prototypical evidential strategies
(corresponding to presentative speech acts) from epistemic modal ones (as
evaluational speech acts), the latter comes into play when the assertive force




a. *but I think it’s not.
b. *but I am not sure.
(Q_ (41a): 0/40; (41b): 0/40)
Evaluational force EvF(p)
(29) I think (that) it’s raining,
a. *but I think it’s not.
b. but I am not sure.
(Q_ (42a): 0/40; (42b): 40/40)
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Presentative force PrF(p)
(30) Apparently, it’s raining,
a. but I think it’s not.
b. but I am not sure.
(Q_ (43a): 34/40; (43b): 37/40)
As can be seen from (28) above, the assertive force of an utterance is aimed
at positing a proposition as a fact, thus neither an evaluational nor a factual
distancing is possible ((28a) and (28b)) (see Martin and White 2005: 98–99 on
the monoglossic status of assertions). On the other hand, an evaluation is
ascriptive to the reasoning process behind the utterance, and is then not com-
patible with a subsequent evaluational distancing (29a). Finally, as given in (30),
a presentative is uttered with the aim of providing a piece of markedly acquired
knowledge. As a result, neither the factuality nor the reasoning process beyond
p are pragmatically at issue16 and are thus potentially defeasible by SP/W ((30a)
and (30b)). The same clearly applies to direct evidence, as the illocutionary force
would still be of a presentative type: I saw it was raining, but I am not sure/ but I
think it was just an illusion.
6 Conclusions
This study shed new light on the relationship between the three domains of
evidentiality, factuality, and epistemic modality. In particular, it reversed the
general procedure of analysis by focusing on the illocutionary force that is
pragmatically conveyed when a proposition is modally marked. What emerged
from this approach is that constative speech acts may alternatively carry an
evaluational, a presentative, or an assertive force. With the operational testing
supported by corpus-based evidence proposed throughout this paper, it is now
possible to disentangle the pragmatic structure of a modally marked statement
and draw some empirical conclusions about the illocutionary force behind a
modal construction or a pragmatic strategy.
Finally, it cannot be denied that multimodal marking, the overt positing of
some preparatory conditions, background knowledge, and also the particular
16 This is not to say that a presentative construction cannot presuppose factuality (i. e. it has
been found that p), but simply that the optimal relevance of a presentative act is not to “state
what is true” nor to “make an evaluation” but rather to provide a piece of acquired knowledge:
it has been found that p, however I think −p.
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intonation of an utterance may all affect the illocutionary force of a constative.
Similarly, it cannot be denied that the perlocutionary effects of a constative
cannot always be generalized or unequivocally predicted, as, for instance, SP/W
may make use of a presentative speech act with the “secret” intention of
persuading AD/R that p is true. That being said, while these are fundamental
topics awaiting for further experimental research, the present account crucially
provides a new empirical methodology for the disambiguation of the modal
marking of constative speech acts at a prototypical level of analysis.
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